What is Asia Afraid Of? The Diversionary Effect of NAFTA\u27s Rules of Origin on Trade Between the United States and Asia by McCall, Kathryn L.
WHAT IS ASIA AFRAID OF? THE DIVERSIONARY EFFECT
OF NAFTA's RULES OF ORIGIN ON TRADE BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND ASIA
"No nation was ever ruined by trade."
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 17, 1992, the Heads of State of Canada, Mexico, and the
United States signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).2
NAFTA took effect on January 1, 1994 after approval by each member
country's legislature.' By eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers among
Canada, Mexico, and the United States over the next fifteen years,4 NAFTA
will create the world's largest free trade area5 with 360 million people and
a total trade output of $6.5 trillion.6
1. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, BARTLETT'S FAMOUS QUOTATIONS 310 (16th ed. 1992).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S. 32 I.L.M. 297
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
3. Id. art. 2203, at 702.
4. Id. arts. 302, 303, at 300-301, arts. 309, 310, 312, 314, at 303, Annex 302.2, at 309.
See Kenneth A. Bacon, Trade Pact Is Likely To Step Up Business Even Before A roval, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 13, 1992, at Al (stating that the agreement will eliminate all tariffs between the
three member nations and will create a free trade zone extending from the "Yukon to the
Yucatan").
5. In a free trade area, barriers to trade are eliminated between the member countries,
while each member maintains its own individual restrictions on trade from non-member
countries. Special Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. XXIV(8)(b),
62 U.N.T.S. 56, 62 [hereinafter Special Protocol to GATT] (amending General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, open for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187). By contrast, members
of a customs union substitute "a single customs territory for two or more customs territories,
so that (i) duties . . . are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade, and (ii)
substantially the same duties . . . are applied by each of the members of the union to trade of
territories not included in the union." Special Protocol to GATT, Art. XXIV(8)(a), 62
U.N.T.S. at 62. Before the GATT definition of a customs union, the customs union: (1)
completely eliminated tariffs among the member territories; (2) established a uniform tariffs on
imports from outside the union; and (3) apportioned customs revenue between the members in
accordance with an agreed formula. JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE 5 (1950). The
most integrated type of trade agreement is an economic union, like the European Union, which
cedes significant national sovereignty over the member country's economic affairs to a regional
body. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE:
ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (1992). In the European Union, trade policy toward the rest
of the world is implemented on a regional basis out of Brussels; the European Court of Justice
handles internal disputes arising from implementation of the Treaty of Rome; and the members
plan to implement a single currency and a European central bank. Id. at 6-7.
6. William A. Orme, Jr., Myth v. Facts: The Whole Truth about the Half-Truths, 72
FOREIGN AFF. 2, 3 (Nov./Dec. 1993). Dean C. Alexander, The North American Free Trade
Agreement: Potential Framework of An Agreement, 14 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 85 (1991). In 1989
the European Community and the European Free Trade Area combined had a population of 358
million and a GNP of $5,784 billion. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 5, at 4.
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While NAFTA will have considerable advantages for the United States,7
the agreement's expected impact on Asia is causing widespread anxiety there.
Asian countries fear that NAFTA will hurt their export-driven economies by
drawing trade and investment away from Asia.8 One Asian leader stated he
feared NAFTA would draw a line down the middle of the Pacific and that
the United States would withdraw from Asia behind this line.9
The Japanese have been particularly vocal in expressing their concern
that NAFTA is protectionist and will have a negative impact on Japan's trade
with North America.'" For example, former Japanese Prime Minister
Kiichi Miyazawa voiced trepidation that NAFTA could turn North America
into a "fortress" against goods from abroad." Similarly, Hiroshi
Hirabayashi, the Deputy Chief Mission at the Japanese Embassy in
Washington, D.C., has argued that several NAFTA provisions "raise barriers
to outside countries." 2
Asian concern over NAFTA is not unfounded. For years, the United
States has provided more economic assistance and access to higher education
7. U.S. goods will be more price competitive in Mexico because they ". . . will compete
on a level playing field against Mexican goods" after trade barriers are removed and will
command a price advantage over non-North American goods which are subject to external trade
barriers. Ann Driscoll, Key Provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, BUS.
AM., Oct. 19, 1992, at 3. NAFTA will make U.S. firms more competitive against European
and Asian producers by enabling U.S. manufacturers to integrate their North American
operations. Id. at 5. "[Clombining U.S. and Canadian capital, skills, technology, and natural
resources with Mexican labor force will offer new competitive strategies in areas where the
United States has been losing market share." Id. at 3. Integration will also make North
American manufacturers more efficient, lowering consumer prices and increasing consumer
choice. Id. See id. for more examples of NAFTA's benefits.
The NAFTA is often seen as North America's response to the European trading bloc
(European Union). HUFBAUER & SCHoTr, supra note 5, at 6. However, none of the three
NAFTA countries were willing to cede the requisite sovereignty to establish regional governing
bodies comparable to the European Union's governing bodies. Id. at 7; see supra note 5 for
an explanation of the European Union's regional institutions.
8. Ramon Isberto, Asia: Export Tigers Growl Over NAFTA, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept.
15, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. "Asian nations fear that under
NAFTA, Mexican competition would substantially erode their share of the giant U.S. market."
Leah Makabenta, Trade: NAFTA Casts Pall Over Asia-Pacific Grouping, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
Sept. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. "The prospect of NAFTA..
. has sent shivers throughout Southeast Asia." K.T. Arasu, NAFTA Seen Cutting ASEAN
Exports by $2 Billion, REUTERS, Nov. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires
File. "Asian nations ... fear they will lose access to North American markets under NAFTA."
Kenneth Barry, NAFTA Defeat Could Hurt Clinton at Asian Summit, REUTERS, Nov. 16, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
9. Background Briefing on APEC by Senior Administration Officials, The White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, Nov. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File
[hereinafter Background Briefing].
10. Isberto, supra note 8.
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and technology to Asia than any other country. 3  Furthermore, the
openness of the United States market to manufactured exports from Asia is
one of the most important factors in the speed of Asia's economic growth. '
4
However, free trade areas (FTAs) are by nature discriminatory because their
success hinges on lower tariff and nontariff barriers benefitting only the
partner countries. 5 To ensure that other countries do not evade the barriers
still applied to nonmembers, FTAs must adopt "rules of origin" to determine
which goods are produced within the member countries and therefore qualify
for preferential treatment. 16 Consequently, NAFTA employs rules of origin
to ensure that only those goods produced within a NAFTA member-country
are afforded the benefits of NAFTA. 7
This comment discusses NAFTA's rules of origin and their potential
impact on U.S. trade with Asia. Part II describes rules of origin, their
significance in international trade, and the pre-NAFTA rules of origin in the
United States. Part III explains NAFTA's rules of origin. Part IV discusses
the growth in the Asian economies and why Asian trade is important to the
United States economy. Part V analyzes the extent to which NAFTA's rules
of origin will impact on trade and investment between the United States and
Asia. Part VI discusses possible responses to NAFTA as Asian countries
seek to protect their trade.
II. RULES OF ORIGIN: DETERMINING A PRODUCT'S "HOME COUNTRY"
Rules of origin are systems whereby countries attempt to determine the
source of an imported good: its country of origin.'" Products today are
usually produced internationally and a single finished product may be the
13. For years, the United States has provided most of the economic assistance to Asia,
offered much of the higher education and technology, and bought more Asian exports than any
other country. David I. Hitchcock, The United States in a Changing Pacific Rim: Asian
Perceptions and the U.S. Response, THE WASH. Q., Autumn, 1989, at 123.
14. Erland Heginbotham, Pacific Basin: Restoring U.S. Economic Leadership; The
Economy of the Pacific Basin, 29 Bus. ECON. 7, 12 (1994).
15. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 5, at 155.
16. Id.; David A. Gantz, Maximizing the Regional Benefits of North American Economic
Integration: Rules of Origin under NAFTA, in MAKING FREE TRADE AREAS WORK IN THE
AMERICAS, 52, 52-53 (Boris Kozolchyk ed., 1993). Because member states do not maintain a
common customs frontier like a customs union, see supra note 5, rules of origin are especially
important in free trade agreements.
17. NAFTA devotes an entire chapter to determining whether a good originates within the
member states for purposes of the agreement. See NAFTA, supra note 2, at ch. IV. In
addition, hundreds of pages of appendices provide further details for the rules. See NAFTA,
supra note 2, annex 401. Only originating goods are eligible for NAFTA's preferential trade
treatment. Therefore, the rules of origin are very important not only to member country
manufacturers, but also to non-member manufacturers.
18. N. David Palmeter, Rules of Origin or Rules of Restriction? A Commentary on a New
Form of Protectionism, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1987). CHRISTIAN D. DEFOULOW,
GLOSSARY OF NAFTA TERMS 74 (1994).
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result of parts and processing from several different countries. 9 Rules of
origin determine the product's origin for application of import duties, import
quotas, tariffs, and fees. A product's origin is important because products
from different countries are afforded different treatment.20 For instance, a
country might require a higher tariff for shoes made in India than shoes made
in Pakistan. Trade quotas or embargo policies of the importing country
might prohibit entry of goods from certain countries and not others.2'
Rules of origin are the mechanism by which the importing country deter-
mines a product's country of manufacture and its subsequent treatment when
imported.'
Rules of origin are important to international manufacturers because
manufacturers may try to relocate their production facilities within a
preferential trading area to take advantage of free trade and lower tariff
rates.' Also, if the manufacturer's product is subject to additional tariffs
because of its origin, these higher costs will directly impact on profits.24
A. Rules of Origin in Free Trade Areas: An Indispensable
Link Between the Member Nations
Rules of origin are particularly important in FTAs because the members
of the FTA do not want "free-riders," those who did not produce their goods
in a member country, taking advantage of the carefully negotiated reductions
in trade barriers between the member countries .' Consequently, an FTA's
rules of origin are designed to ensure that significant economic activity goes
into the production of a good in a particular country before an importer can
19. U.S. GEN. Acc'T OFF., INTERNATIONAL TRADE: RULES OF ORIGIN FOR THE U.S.-
CANADA FREE TRADE AREA at 5 (Sept. 1987).
20. For example, goods originating in the Philippines received preferential treatment from
the United States until 1974 under the Laurel-Langley Trade Agreement. Trade Agreement
Renewing the Agreement of July 4, 1946, Sept. 6, 1955, U.S.-Phil., 6 U.S.T 2981.
21. Products from the People's Republic of China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Cuba
were all denied entry into the United States from 1941-1976 under the Trading with the Enemy
Act, 50 U.S.C.S. apps § 5(b) (1941-76) and regulations thereunder, 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1994)
(China, North Korea, North Vietnam); 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1994) (Cuba).
22. Over the last twenty years, rules of origin have become exceedingly important. Nations
rely on tariff preferences, "buy national" requirements, voluntary restraints agreements, anti-
dumping, and countervailing duties to open markets for some products and producers and to
close markets to others. See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Growing Importance of
Rules of Origin, in Trade Law and Policy Institute, 211, 213-15 (PLI Com. L. & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 510, 1989). All these policies require the use of rules of origin.
See Sabrena A. Silver, NAFTA's Rules of Origin for Automobiles: A Need for Reform, 62
FORDHAM LAW REV. 2245, 2251-55 (1994) for an analysis of how the above policies employ
rules of origin.
23. Joseph A. LaNasa, Rules of Origin Under the North American Free Trade Agreement:
A Substantial Transformation into Objectively Transparent Protectionism, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J.
381, 382 (1993).
24. See Id. at 381.
25. See Frederic P. Contin & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Rules of Origin, The Canada-U.S.
FTA and the Honda Case, 87 AM. J. INT'L LAW 375, 376 (1993).
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claim that country as the source of the good and thereby take advantage of
preferential trade rules.26
In addition, the rules guard against trade deflection or the trans-shipment
of goods. Trade deflection occurs when products are only slightly altered or
repackaged in a member country in order to mask the real country of
origin. 7 Trans-shipment occurs when goods are imported into the member
country with the lowest external trade barriers (country A). 2  These goods
are then exported to other member countries (countries B and C) with higher
external tariff barriers than country A. Since the goods are now considered
products of member country A, they are not subject to countries B's and C's
higher trade barriers. Thus, the manufacturer in a non-member country
avoids the higher trade barriers of some member countries by trans-shipping
its goods through the member country with the lowest external trade
barriers.29
B. The Substantial Transformation Test: Rules of Origin
in the United States Before NAFTA
Rules of origin are hardly newcomers to the international trade arena.
In 1887, the United States Supreme Court first wrestled with the problem of
a product's origin in Hartranft v. Wiegman." The Court ruled that a good
is a product of the last country where it has been "manufactured into a new
and different article, having a distinctive name, character or use from that"
of the original article or good.3 The Hartranft rule came to be known as
the substantial transformation test.32 From 1887, until the implementation
of NAFTA in 1994, the United States employed the judicially developed
26. Harry B. Endsley & Steven Baker, A Practical Guide to Customs, Tariffs, and Rules
of Origin under NAFTA, in NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY 1,
121 (James R. Holbein & Donald J. Musch eds., Sept. 1994); HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra
note 5, at 155.
27. NAFTA Origin Rules Will Test Gray Areas of Customs Interpretations, Report Says, 9
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 43, at 1856 (Oct. 1992).
28. LaNasa, supra note 23, at 386.
29. Id.
30. 121 U.S. 609 (1887).
31. Id. at 615.
32. The term "substantial transformation" is not used in the opinion. However, Hartranft
has become known as the early case which provided the definition for the term "substantial
transformation." For instance, Anheuser-Busch Association v. United States, 207 U.S. 556
(1908) cites to Hartranft when stating that "[m]anufacturing implies a change, but every change
is not manufacture .... [Slomething more is necessary as set forth and illustrated in Hartranft
v. Weidman, 121 U.S. 609 (1887)." Id. at 562. "For a manufacturing process to substantially
transform a good, a new and different article must emerge having a distinctive name, character,
or use." Id. at 562 (emphasis added).
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substantial transformation test, supplemented by various legislative acts,33
to decide a product's country of origin.
This test was fraught with problems. While many statutes and court
decisions required a substantial transformation to decide a product's country
of origin, none provided a description of "transformation" or a method of
measuring what was "substantial. '34  Customs officials and courts used
many different criteria in making their substantial transformation determina-
tions.
The subjectivity and discretion afforded both the customs officials and
the courts36 made the rules unpredictable, hard to administer consistently,
and vulnerable to political pressure in their administration. One defendant
even argued that the "substantial transformation" language was so ambiguous
33. For example, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 used the substantial transformation test
to describe when a product will be considered a product of a country. 19 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(B).
For country of origin marking, the United States Customs Service, Treasury, uses the substantial
transformation test to decide when a product is a product of a country. 19 C.F.R. § 134. 1(b).
34. Anheuser-Busch Association v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908) ("for a
manufacturing process to substantially transform a good, a new and different article must emerge
having a distinctive name, character, or use."). See Belcrest Linens v. United States, 741 F.2d
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (bolts of woven fabric imported from the People's Republic of China into
Hong Kong and manufactured into pillowcases in Hong Kong were products of Hong Kong when
subsequently imported into the United States because changing the cloth into pillowcases changed
the character, appearance, identity and use of the cloth); Uniroyal, Inc. v. United States, 542
F. Supp. 1026 (Ct Int'l Trade 1982, aff'd, 702 F.2d 1022 (1983) (merely minor manufacturing
and combining processes which leave the identity of the article intact do not cause a substantial
transformation); and Torrington Co. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1563, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985)(wire which was straightened, cut to a particular length, pressed to form an eye, grooved along
the entire length, sharpened and stamped with a logo, hardened, tempered, buffed, polished, and
plated to form a sewing machine needles was substantially transformed into a new article).
35. The criteria used to denote a substantial transformation included: (1) lost identity; (2)
the distinction between producer and consumer goods; (3) a value-added standard (value-added
to the product by the manufacturing process); (4) a comparison of processing operations (bow
much capital investment, how much labor, degree of complexity); and (5) a change in tariff
classification. See C. Edward Galfand, Heeding The Call For Predictable Rules of Origin, 11
U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 469, 480-84 (1989).
Even the same criteria have been applied inconsistently. For example, when using the
"distinction between producer and consumer good" test, two courts defined the test differently.
In Midwood Industries, Inc. v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 951 (Cust. Ct. 1970), the
transformation of an article from a producer's good to a consumer's good substantially trans-
formed the good. However, in Uniroyal, Inc. v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 1026 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1982), a similar transformation did not substantially transform the good. Three years later
in Torrington Co. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1985), the transformation from
a producer good to a consumer good once again substantially transformed the product like in
Midwood Industries. However, one year later, the court rejected the producer to consumer
good test as determinative of origin. National Juice Products Ass'n v. United States, 628 F.
Supp. 978 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986).
36. The terms "new and different article" and "distinctive name, character or use" are
applied on a case-by-case basis by the Customs Service and by the courts, and are highly
subjective by nature. An article which appears "new and different" to one person may not
appear so to another. There is no bright line between situations where assembly or processing
in the county of export has resulted in a "substantial transformation" and where it has not done
so. See Palmeter, supra note 18, (describing judicial confusion in interpreting the substantial
transformation rule). See Endsley & Baker, supra note 26, at 125.
37. LaNasa, supra note 23, at 384. See supra notes 34-36.
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 25, No. 2 [1995], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol25/iss2/5
NAFTA AND TRADE BETWEEN U.S. AND ASIA
that it was unconstitutionally vague even though it was backed with almost
one hundred years of case law.39
Thus, the substantial transformation test failed to give the United States
a useful, predictable standard. Instead of a bright line rule, the United States
had only a vague concept, inconsistently developed over the past century
through common law, customs regulations and rulings, and even occasional
congressional tinkering.'
III. THE NAFTA's RULES OF ORIGIN
The NAFTA rules of origin raised some of the more controversial and
difficult issues in the NAFTA negotiations.41 The governments involved,
as well as those representing economic and political interests in the three
countries, wanted the reduced duties available under NAFTA to benefit only
products that involve significant manufacturing and other economic activity
in the three countries.42 Most particularly, the NAFTA members did not
want Mexico, with its lower wage rates and other costs, to be used as an
"export platform"43 for entry into the United States of goods that consisted
largely of third-country" materials. 4'
Consequently, the NAFTA rules of origin are detailed, complex, and
comprehensive.46 NAFTA includes a twenty-six page Rules of Origin
section, including express definitions of thirty terms, a seventeen page
Customs Procedure section, two pages of a Notes section, and a 169 page
annex with specific rules of origin for individual Harmonized System
38. United States v. Murray, 621 F.2d 1163, 1168-69 (1st Cir. 1980).
39. Id. See Hartranft v. Weigman, 121 U.S. 609 (1887) and supra notes 34-35.
40. LaNasa, supra note 23, at 384. For examples of congressional treatment of the
'substantial transformation test" see 19 C.F.R. § 134.1(b) and 19 U.S.C.S. § 2518(4)(B).
41. Donald Harrison & Kenneth G. Wiegel, Customs Provisions and Rules of Origin Under
the NAFTA, 27 INT'L LAW 647, 653-54. See also, Donald Harrison, Rules of Origin Under the
North American Free Trade Agreement, in THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
A NEW FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE AMERICAS, 39, 40
(Judith H. Bello, et al. eds., 1994).
42. See Harrison & Wiegel, supra note 41, at 654. Harrison, supra note 41, at 40. See
also HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 5, at 155; U. S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, POTENTIAL
IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE-
TRADE AGREEMENT 3-2 (Jan. 1993) [hereinafter POTENTIAL IMPACT].
43. Harrison & Wiegel, supra note 41, at 645. Mexico could serve as an "export
platform" by allowing the transshipment or trade deflection of goods. For a discussion of
transshipment and trade deflection, see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
44. "Third-country" refers to non-NAFTA-member countries.
45. For example, the United States feared that Japanese firms, already attracted by the low-
wage Mexican labor force, would increase their investments in Mexico and use those
investments to launch exports into the U.S. Endsley & Baker, supra note 26, at 121. See also,
Harrison, supra note 41, at 40.
46. Harrison & Wiegel, supra note 41, at 654.
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chapters .
Under Article 401 of NAFTA, a good is an originating good when:
(1) It is wholly obtained or produced in the NAFTA region; 4
(2) It is produced within the NAFTA region wholly from originating
materials ;49
(3) It is produced entirely in the NAFTA territory and each non-
originating good imported and used in the production of the good
undergoes an applicable change in tariff classification as a result
of the production;"
(4) It is produced in the NAFTA territory, using one or more non-
originating materials which do not undergo a tariff classification
change, but the regional value content of the good is not less than
50% or 60% depending on the method of calculation employed
pursuant to Article 402 of the NAFTA.5
The first two categories pertain only to those goods which are made of
wholly NAFTA territory originating materials. The last two categories
concern goods which contain non-originating materials. NAFTA utilizes two
rules of origin mechanisms to determine a product's origin if it contains
materials from non-member countries: tariff-shift rules and value-content
rules.5 2
A. Tariff-Shift Rules
A good may qualify as an originating good only when each non-
originating material 3 used to produce the good undergoes an applicable
"change in tariff classification" as a result of production in one or more of
the NAFTA countries." The particular change required depends on the
tariff classification of the good involved. 5 A change in origin based on a
47. NAFTA, supra note 2, ch. 4, at 349-56; annex 401, at 397-456. By contrast, the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement which entered into force on January 1, 1989,
consisted of only seven pages of rules of origin, including a five page "Rules" section, with
definitions of only five terms, a two page "Interpretations" section, and a 27 page listing of the
"rules for individual provisions of the Harmonized Tariff System." Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement, Dec. 22-23, 1987 and Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter
U.S.-Canada FTA].
48. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 401(a), at 349. Goods wholly obtained or produced in the
territory of one of the NAFTA members include mineral goods, agricultural goods, fish
products, goods from the seabed, goods from outer space, and waste. Id. art. 415, 354-56.
49. Id. art. 401(c), at 349.
50. Id. art. 401(b), at 349.
51. Id. art. 401(d), at 349.
52. Id. art. 401, at 349.
53. Material that does not qualify as originating under the NAFTA origin rules.
54. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 401(b), at 349.
55. See NAFTA, supra note 2, Annex 401, § A, at 397.
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shift in tariff classification is a relatively recent development resulting from
the adoption by most countries of the International Convention on the
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System ("Harmonized Sys-
tem"). 6
The Harmonized System classifies products according to a hierarchical
framework that reflects increasing degrees of technical sophistication and
economic effort.57 The Harmonized System has over 5,000 article descrip-
tions which appear as "headings" or "subheadings." These descriptions are
arranged into ninety-seven chapters. Goods are identified by name and are
categorized on the basis of their end use or materials."
The Harmonized System classification number consists of six digits.
Any remaining digits, if utilized, are country specific and meet each nation's
individual tariff and statistical requirements. The first two digits are the
"Chapter" in which the product is contained. 9  The next two digits are
called the "Heading" and provide a more specific description of the product.
The third two digits represent the "subheading" and provide a still more
specific level of description.'
The United States implemented this system on January 1, 1989, as the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS).61 The United
States added a final four digits to the tariff classification number, making the
tariff classification number ten digits. The seventh and eighth digits
represent U.S. tariff subdivisions of the International Harmonized System.62
The last two digits are for statistical use only and do not affect the duty rate.
NAFTA uses the Harmonized System to describe the specific changes
which imported goods must undergo in the United States, Canada, or Mexico
to qualify for preferential treatment under NAFTA.63 Under NAFTA, a
good qualifies as an originating good' when each of the non-originating
materials used to produce the good is sufficiently transformed in one or more
56. Done at Brussels on June 14, 1983, and the Protocol thereto, done at Brussels on June
24, 1986, reprinted in UKTS 15 (1989). The Harmonized Systems was implemented by its
original parties on January 1, 1988. Since the Harmonized System was opened for signature in
1987, some 71 countries and customs or economic unions have become contracting parties.
Endsley & Baker, supra note 26, at 42. The United States acceded to the Harmonized System
on October 31, 1988, effective January 1, 1989. 19 U.S.C. § 3011. Canada acceded to the
Harmonized System on December 14, 1987, effective January 1, 1988. Mexico acceded to the
Harmonized System on September 6, 1991, effective March 6, 1992. Endsley & Baker, supra
note 26, at 37.
57. Galfand, supra note 35, at 489-90.
58. Endsley & Baker, supra note 26, at 38.
59. Id. at 39.
60. Id.
61. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3012 (1988).
62. Endsley & Baker, supra note 26, at 38.
63. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 413(a), at 354 formally designates the Harmonized System
as the "basis for tariff classification" in Chapter Four of the Agreement pertaining to rules of
origin.
64. A good that originates within the NAFTA.
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of NAFTA countries that it is classified differently under the Harmonized
System.65 Depending on the good involved, the non-NAFTA components
or materials included in the finished good must be in a different Harmonized
System chapter, heading, subheading, or tariff item than the finished good
itself.66 The details of the required tariff shifts are set out in Annex 401 of
NAFTA.
The following illustration is an example of the tariff-shift rules of
origin under NAFTA: Canada produces bread, pastries, cakes, and biscuits,
which come under Harmonized System Number 1905.90, with flour imported
from Europe. The flour is categorized as Harmonized System Chapter 11.
These items are then shipped to the United States. The applicable rule of
origin states: "A change to heading 19.02 through 19.05 from any other
chapter." 67  Thus, for all products classified in Harmonized System
Headings 1902 through 1905, all non-North American inputs must be
classified in an Harmonized System chapter other than Harmonized System
Chapter 19 in order to be considered "originating goods." These baked
goods would qualify for NAFTA benefits because the non-originating
material, the flour, is classified outside of Chapter 19.
B. Value-Content Rules
Where the non-originating part or parts do not qualify as originating
goods under the change in tariff classification test,68 the product can still be
treated as originating in NAFTA if it meets the required regional value-
content test. 69
Regional value-content rules require a percentage of the value of the
good to be North American.7' A good will qualify as an originating good
if the assembly of such parts and components within NAFTA accounts for
sixty percent of the value of the finished product7 or fifty percent of the net
cost of the product.72 Under Article 402 of NAFTA, the regional value
content can be calculated by either the transaction value or the net-cost
method.
65. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 401(b), at 349.
66. Id.
67. Id. Annex 401, § IV, ch. 19, at 399.
68. For example, it would be impossible in North America for a bicycle assembled from
foreign parts to comply with the change in tariff classification because the Harmonized System
classifies the parts of the bicycle (e.g. handlebar, chain, and seat) under the same classification
number as an assembled bicycle. Paul Asker, Changes in the Rules of Origin in the United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: A Preliminary Evaluation, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1545,
1554-55 (1990). Thus, even though the bicycle is fully assembled in a member country, it
would not qualify as an originating goods because its tariff heading has not changed. Id.
69. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 401(d), at 349.
70. Id. arts. 401(d), 402(1)-(12), at 349-51.
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1. The Transaction Value Method
The transaction value method generally means the price actually paid or
payable for the good.7 3  The transaction value method is generally easier
to calculate than the net-cost method." A manufacturer may choose
whichever method is most advantageous to his goods with certain excep-
tions. 7s
The transaction-value method calculates regional content by: (1) subtract-
ing the price paid for non-NAFTA-origin materials used in the production of
the good from the price charged the consumer for the finished good and (2)
dividing that figure by the price charged the consumer.76 If the product
contains more than sixty percent regional value content, it qualifies as an
originating good.77 Put simply, the assembly of parts and components
within the NAFTA zone must account for at least sixty percent of the value
of the finished product. For example, a Mexican manufacturer produces
electric hair curling irons from Japanese hair curler parts. Each curling iron
is sold for U.S.$4.40. The value of the non-originating hair curler parts is
U.S.$1.80. The regional value content under the transaction value method
is:
(4.40 - 1.80) x 100 = 59.1%
4.40
The hair curling iron is not an originating good because its regional value
content is below 60% using the transaction value method.
2. The Net-Cost Method
The net-cost method is based on the total cost of the good minus sales
promotion, marketing, after-sales service, royalties, shipping, packing, and
non-allowable interest CoStS. 7  The net-cost method calculates regional
content by subtracting the price paid for non-NAFTA-origin materials from
the net cost to the producer of the good and dividing that figure by the net
73. Endsley & Baker, supra note 26, at 136.
74. Id. at 137.
75. The transaction value method may not be used when: (1) there is no transaction value
for the good; (2) the transaction value of the good is unacceptable under Article 1 of the GATT
Customs and Valuation Code; (3) in certain related party transactions; (4) for certain automotive
goods, footwear, and word processing machines; (5) when the exporter or producer elects to
.accumulate" regional value content; and (6) when the good is designated as an "intermediate"
material and is subject to a regional value contents requirement. NAFTA, supra note 2, art.
402(5), at 350.
76. Id. art. 402(2), at 349. Regional Value Content = (TV-VNM/TV)10 where TV =
transaction value and VNM = value of non-originating materials. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. art. 402(8), at 350.
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cost to the producer.79 If the product contains more than fifty percent
regional content, it will qualify as an originating product. 8°
For example, assume the Mexican manufacturer above uses the net cost
method for the hair curling irons imported into the United States. The total
cost for the hair curler is U.S.$3.90. This figure includes U.S.$0.25 for
shipping and packing costs. There are no other costs. The net cost therefore
is U.S.$3.65. The regional value content under the net cost method is:
(3.65 - 1.80) x 100 = 50.7%
3.65
The hair curling iron would be considered an originating good using the net
cost method because the regional value content is a little over 50%.
C. The De Minimis Exception
Under NAFTA's tariff shift rules, each non-originating material must
undergo the required change in tariff classification. However, some products
may have very low or insignificant percentages of non-originating materials
and thus may not undergo the required tariff shift to be a NAFTA originating
good.
Article 405 of NAFTA avoids this problem by creating the de minimus
exception. Under the de minimus exception, a product may still be classified
as North American if the non-originating material is less than seven percent
of the transaction value or the total cost of the good.8" For example, a
chair made of North American materials and non-NAFTA materials will be
an originating good if the total value of the non-NAFTA materials is less
than seven percent of the transaction value or the total cost of the chair.
D. Specific Rules of Origin for Various Trade Sectors
NAFTA provides specific rules of origin for two trade sectors,
automotive goods and textiles and apparel. These specific rules for these two
sectors proved to be the most difficult to negotiate' and include the most
79. Id. art. 402(3), at 349. Regional Value Content = (NC-VNM/NC)100 where NC =
net cost and VNM = value of non-originating materials. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. art. 405(l)-(2), at 352-53.
82. Gantz, supra note 16, at 39; Endsley & Baker, supra note 26, at 158. Automotive
manufacturing is of enormous importance for all three NAFTA countries. Harrison, supra note
41, at 53. Automotive products are the largest component of the trade in manufactured goods
between the United States and Canada and the United States and Mexico. NAFTA: ISSUES
RELATED TO TEXTILE/APPAREL AND AUTO AND AUTO PARTS INDUSTRIES, U.S. GEN. ACCT.
OFF. 2 (May 4, 1993) [hereinafter ISSUES]. Consistent with the enormous importance of
manufacturing and trade in and among the three countries involved, NAFTA includes separate
rules of origin for automotive goods. Harrison & Wiegel, supra note 41, at 659.
Choosing a rule of origin for textiles and apparel was a contentious debate. Endsley &
[Vol. 25
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stringent rules of origin.
In the automotive sector, the rules of origin are a combination of a
change in tariff classification and regional value content or a change in tariff
heading alone.83 Where the regional value content applies, the net cost
method must be used.M
After lengthy and difficult negotiations,' the negotiators agreed that the
regional value content requirement would remain at 50% for the first four
years of the agreement.86 It will be raised in two stages until it reaches
62.5 %, its permanent level.87
In the textile and apparel sector, all products wholly-made from yarn and
fabric produced in North America and assembled in North America will
receive duty-free treatment .88 Goods produced from some fabrics which are
not normally produced in the NAFTA territory, such as silks and tweeds,
will receive duty-free treatment up to fixed levels.'
IV. ASIA-UNITED STATES TRADE: ESSENTIAL FOR THE ECONOMIC
GROWTH OF BOTH ASIA AND THE UNITED STATES
The NAFTA rules of origin are explicitly designed to assure "that the
benefits of tariff reductions . . . accrue principally to the NAFTA parties and
to provide incentives for North American production and sourcing."' The
impact these rules of origin will have on Asian trade with the United States
is generating widespread anxiety there. The economic ministers of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)9 and Japan have
Baker, supra note 26, at 158. Canada and the United States have different perspectives on this
issue based on their manufacturing processes. Canada relies primarily on fabrics imported from
Europe while the United States uses North American fabrics. Id. at 158 n.503. Canada wanted
a rule or origin which gave NAFTA preferential treatment to garments assembled in North
America regardless of where the yarn or fabric originated. Id. at 158. U.S. and Mexican
manufacturers wanted strict rules of origin requiring textile goods to use North American yarn
or fabric. Id. In exchange for the strict "yarn forward" rule promulgated by the United States
and Mexico, Canada was granted an increase in its tariff preference levels to allow a certain
number of Canadian textile and apparel exports to the United States to be exempt from domestic
content rules. Id. See Galfand, supra note 35, at 491 for further explanation of why the
regional value content rules do not apply to textiles and apparel goods.
83. Endsley & Baker, supra note 26, at 160.
84. NAFTA, supra note 2, arts. 402(5)(d)(i), (ii), art. 403, at 350-52.
85. Endsley & Baker, supra note 26, at 160.
86. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 403(5)(a), at 351.
87. Id.
88. Id. Annex 300-B, §§ 1 and 2, at 327, Annex 401, § XI, at 407.
89. Id.
90. POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 42, at xi.
91. ASEAN includes Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the
Philippines. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 1233(1967). ASEAN was formed in 1967 to accelerate economic growth, social progress and
cultural development in the region. Id. at 1234. The ASEAN nations pledged to promote active
collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social,
cultural, technical, and administrative spheres. Id.
19951
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expressed concern that NAFTA might become an exclusionary regional
economic block.92  Malaysian and South Korean officials have expressed
similar concerns about NAFTA's potentially disadvantageous effect on their
economies.93
The question becomes just how important is Asian trade with the United
States to Asia and how will the NAFTA's rules of origin affect that trade.
The remainder of this comment discusses (1) the economic "miracle" of Asia
and the United States' crucial role in fostering this "miracle;" (2) the
importance of United States-Asian trade for the United States' economic
prosperity; and (3) the effect NAFTA's rules of origin will have on this
trade.
A. The "Economic Miracle" of Asia
Just fifty years ago, Japan faced the task of totally rebuilding its
economy.94 Thirty years ago, East Asia95 seemed destined for endless
suffering. 96 However, by 1993, East Asia and Japan had become an engine
of the global economy and a defining part of the post-Cold War international
system.97
Japan was devastated after World War 11.98 Since the outbreak of
92. See ASEAN, Japan, to Express Concern Over NAFTA, Japan Economic Newswire, Oct.
22, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File [hereinafter ASEAN, Japan Concern];
Japan Voices Concern on Exclusionary Nature of NAFTA, Japan Economic Newswire, Oct. 17,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File [hereinafter Exclusionary Nature].
93. Japan to Oppose NAFTA at APEC Meeting, Agence France Presse, Sept. 7, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File; ROK and Japan to Promote Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation as Response to NAFTA, British Broadcasting Corp., Summary of World
Broadcasts, Nov. 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
94. See Joseph A. McKinney, Implications of NAFTA for Japan's Trade Relations, in THE
CHALLENGE OF NAFTA: NORTH AMERICA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE WORLD
TRADE REGIME 123, 124-25 (Robert G. Cushing et al. eds., 1993) (describing how Japan
rebuilt its economy after World War II to its present level).
95. East Asia is defined by the U.S. International Trade Commission as the countries of
Brunei, China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Taiwan, and Thailand. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 262, EAST ASIA: REGIONAL
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES (PART 1 OF 9) 3 (May
1993) [hereinafter EAST ASIA PART I]. For the purposes of this article, "East Asia" is used to
separate Japan from other Asian nations. While most of Asia is still growing and developing,
Japan possesses an aging and established economy. Heginbotham, supra note 14, at 12. Thus,
in this article "Asia will refer to the East Asian countries and Japan while "East Asia" does
not include Japan.
96. Jim Rohwer, Asia Survey, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 1993 at 4.
97. Robert A. Manning & Paula Stem, The Myths of the Pacific Community, 73 FOREIGN
AFF., 79, 80 (Nov./Dec. 1994).
98. In the period immediately following World War 11, Japan's economy was in a state of
near devastation. YASUO AOTO, ET. AL., NIPPON: THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLE 73 (Richard
Foster & John Bowen trans., 1982). At the end of World War II, Japanese industry was at a
virtual standstill. All of Japan's great cities, with the exception of Kyoto, and most of its lesser
cities had been in large part destroyed and their populations scattered throughout the country.
The economy, critically maimed, cut off from its normal flows of trade, and disrupted by the
uncertainties of foreign rule, recovered only very slowly - much more slowly than in war-
[Vol. 25
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Japan's war with China in 1931, 3.1 million Japanese had perished-of
whom 800,000 were civilians. 99 Forty percent of Japan's urban buildings
had been destroyed."° Japanese industry had been reduced to 25% of its
pre-War potential. I'O So great was the destruction, the New York Times
Magazine predicted in late 1945, that the economy of Japan was not "likely
to expand sharply .... The prospect [is for] a return to Japan's status as a
small, self-contained nation."" However, by 1968, Japan was third
among the world's industrial powers. 1°3 Today, Japan is the second largest
industrial power in the world."0
The growth of the East Asian economies is equally astounding. In 1960,
the East Asian economies comprised four percent of the world's gross
national product (GNP). 15 The region was engulfed in war and great
power confrontations, 0 6 burdened with poverty, 1 7 and challenged by
insurgent communist movements.'18 In 1992, these East Asian economies
accounted for 25% of the global GNP."° By the year 2000, they are
projected to account for a third of the world's GNP."' From 1980 to
1991, the East Asian share of world trade (exports plus imports) almost
doubled, growing from 7.5% to nearly 14%."'
In Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea the growth in
annual real gross domestic product (GDP) averaged 8.6% from 1985-
1990.112 The aggressive growth of these four countries earned them the
devastated Europe. It took a full decade before per capita production had crept back to the
levels of the mid-1930s. EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER, THE JAPANESE 103 (1980).
99. JOHN WHITNEY HALL, JAPAN: FROM PREHISTORY TO MODERN TIMES 349 (1990).
100. ROBERT C, CHRISTOPHER, THE JAPANESE MIND 18 (1984).
101. HALL, supra note 99, at 349.
102. CHRISTOPHER, supra note 100, at 19.
103. HALL, supra note 99, at 355.
104. Paul Krugman, The Myth of Asia's Miracle, 73 FOREIGN POL'Y 62, 73 (Nov./Dec.
1994).
105. Hobart Rowen, The Promise of Trade with Asia, THE WASH. POST, May 27, 1993,
at A25.
106. Korea was flattened by civil war in the early 1950s. Indochina, and especially
Vietnam, fought war after war with the French and the Americans. Rohwer, supra note 96, at
4.
107. For example, South Korea's gross domestic product (G.D.P.) per head in 1962 was
U.S.$110. Taiwan's was U.S.$160 and China's was U.S.$60. Japan, the richest country in
Asia in the 1960s, had a GDP per head of U.S.$380, one-eighth of America's GDP. Id.
108. See James A. Baker, III, America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific
Community, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (Winter 1991). "In China, Mao Zedong loosed the Red Guards
in the mid-1960s to carry out one of the most murderous abolitions of law and order ever
seen-until the Khmers Rouges took away that distinction by killing 15-20% of Cambodia's
population, especially the educated part, in the mid-1970s." Rohwer, supra note 96, at 4.
109. Rowen, supra note 105.
110. Manning & Stem, supra note 97, at 81.
111. Mary Pierson, East Asia: Regional Economic Integration and Implications for the
United States, 5 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 161, 162 (March 22, 1994).
112. EAST ASIA PART I, supra note 95, at 34.
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nickname the "four tigers." In the same period, the growth in GDP
averaged 6.8% in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.'
China presently sustains a 13% growth rate and is the current leader of
growth in the Pacific Basin. 114
The average 8 % growth rate of the Pacific Basin's developing economies
continues unabated into 1994, notwithstanding the continued recession in
Japan and Western industrial nations."l5 This strong economic performance
will continue into the next century for four reasons: (1) savings rates are
high; (2) market-oriented policies prevail; (3) national economies are
increasingly open; and (4) trade within the region is growing strongly." 6
Economists predict that growth in Asia will average at least double that of
the industrialized world over the last quarter of this century." 7
B. Asia's Dependence Upon the United States
In the early stages of their economic development, Japan and later the
"four tigers," emphasized low-wage, labor-intensive industries.118  Eco-
nomic growth depended primarily on exporting products to the United
States'19 and the capital generated from the sale of these exports. 20
Consequently, the United States became the principle stalwart supporting
Asia's rapid growth.' 2' The U.S. bought most of its exports 122 and
offered it more higher education and technology than any other country.'1
23
As Japan, followed by the "four tigers," grew economically, their labor
113. Id.
114. Heginbotham, supra note 14, at 8, 9.
115. Id. at 7, 8.
116. Stephen W. Bosworth, The United States and Asia, 71 FOREIGN POLICY 113, 114
(1991/1992).
117. Thomas J. Duesterberg, Trade, Investment, and Engagement in the U.S.-East Asian
Relationship, THE WASH. Q. 73, 73 (Winter, 1994).
118. Heginbotham, supra note 14, at 10.
119. The United States was the key export market for these goods. For instance, almost
one-quarter of Korean total exports go to United States markets. See Kim Dayong-Luan, South
Korea's Export Machine Faces Problems, REUTERS, Sept. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Wires File (reporting that in the first half of 1992, Korea exported $8.72 billion worth
of goods to the United States, representing 23.8% of Korea's total exports).
120. "[E]xport-led growth . . . produced in East Asia the fastest rise in incomes."
Rohwer, supra note 96, at 4.
121. Heginbotham, supra note 14, at 8.
122. In 1970, the United States purchased 31.2% of Japan's exports and 29.4% of East
Asia's. David Robertson, NAFTA, the EC Single Market, and the World Trade Regime, in THE
CHALLENGE OF NAFTA: NORTH AMERICA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE WORLD
TRADE REGIME 53, 55 (Jeffrey J. Schott et al., eds. 1993). In contrast, Western Europe bought
14.8% of Japan's exports and 15.8% of East Asia's exports. Id.
123. Hitchcock, supra note 13, at 123.
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and land costs consequently rose.' These increases in costs threatened the
price competitiveness of their products. Both Japan, and later the "four
tigers," turned to domestic development of more advanced industries.' 21
They then invested in other Asian countries, mainly Thailand, Malaysia, and
Indonesia, with lower labor and land costs to produce the lower priced goods
formerly produced in their own country. 2 6 Thus, as each Asian economy
moved up the ladder of development, it accelerated the growth of those on
a lower tier of development. 27
The growing economies in Asia generated a greater demand for products
and were able to absorb some of the increased production output of the
region. ' However, the principal buyer of Asian goods remains the United
States. 9 The openness of the United States market to manufactured
exports from Asia is one of the most important factors in the speed of Asia's
economic growth. 3 ' Without the United States as a market for its goods,
much of the economic growth of Asia would halt.'
C. The United States' Dependence on Asia
The United States has long pursued an open trading relationship with
Asia. In 1784, the merchant ship Empress of China sailed from New York
to Canton to trade with China.' To end Japan's isolationist policy begun
124. Id. See also, Hal Hill, ASEAN Economic Development: An Analytical Survey, 53 J.
ASIAN STUD. 852, 848-51 (describing how first Japan and then the ASEAN nations shifted their
labor-intensive export industries from their own country to Asian countries with newly
industrializing economies).
125. For example, the "four tigers" have been relocating labor-intensive industries such as
textiles, athletic footwear, toys, and electronic assembly to China, other ASEAN members, and
to Vietnam. Manning & Stem, supra note 97, at 83.
126. Heginbotham, supra note 14, at 10; Manning & Stem, supra note 97, at 82-83.
127. Manning & Stem, supra note 97, at 82. Thus, the economies of East Asia share the
"fruits" of their growth by spurring the growth of other less developed nations. See Riddle of
East Asia's Success: Economic Miracle or Myth? THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 1993, (U.K.
Edition) available in LEXIS, News Library, Mags File.
128. The burst of late-1980s development accelerated growth of an affluent middle class
throughout Southeast Asia leading to an outburst of upscale consumer spending. Heginbotham,
supra note 14, at 11-12.
129. Id. at 12. The U.S. has absorbed some two-thirds of the expansion of manufactured
exports of developing East Asia for more than a decade, and especially from China in recent
years. Id. at 8.
130. Id. at 8. For example, a manual about Japan compiled for foreign employees of
Nippon Steel Corporation cited the existence of a major export market for Japanese goods in the
United States as a primary factor in Japan's high rate of economic growth after World War II.
AoTO, supra note 98, at 81.
131. See Heginbotham, supra note 14, at 8. "Exports will remain an indispensable
ingredient for the success of up-and-coming Asians." Rohwer, supra note 96, at 13.
132. Baker, supra note 108, at 3.
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in 1632,133 President Fillmore commissioned Commodore Matthew C.
Perry to open Japan's borders to United States trade in 1852.11
1. The Growth of United States-Asian Trade
Today, trade between the United States and Asia is more important than
ever. From 1978 to 1991, U.S. trade with Asia grew 400%,'13 rising from
$80 billion in 1978 to $361 billion in 1993.36 East and Southeast Asia
absorbed one-third of the total $422 billion in U.S. exports in 1991.137
Three million jobs in the U.S. are supported by trade with Asia.13 1 Over
the last fifteen years, Asia has surpassed Europe as America's most important
overseas trading region. 39  For example, in 1991, the United States
exported more to Thailand than to the former Soviet Union, more to
Indonesia than to central and eastern Europe, and more to Singapore than to
Spain and Italy."w
In 1991, United States exports to East Asia exceeded its exports to any
individual country except Canada. 14 United States firms have invested
more than $61 billion in the region and Asian investments in the United
States total over $95 billion. 142
While Japan is not part of the current "economic miracle" in East
133. In 1632, Japan adopted a rigid national policy of seclusion. HALL, supra note 99, at
141. Japan's rulers adopted this isolationist policy in the belief that foreign relations and foreign
trade held dangers. Both might serve as adjuncts to foreign attack and might be valuable
weapons in the hands of a powerful noble who sought to supplant his ruler. W.G. BEASLEY,
THE MEII RESTORATION 74 (1972). In 1636, overseas Japanese were prohibited from returning
to Japan for fear that they might "contaminate" the populace with foreign ideas. "Japanese ships
were limited to coastal vessels unsuitable for ocean voyage. Relations with the outside world
were limited to a few contacts with Korea and through Okinawa, China." REISCHAUER, supra
note 98, at 68.
134. "Repeated efforts had been made by various Western nations to persuade the Japanese
to open their doors before the United States dispatched about a quarter of its navy, under the
command of Commodore Perry, to force the Japanese to give American ships access to their
ports." REISCHAUER, supra note 98, at 78. Faced with the Commodore's battleships, against
which she had no defense, Japan was faced with little alternative but to open to foreigners. See
HALL, supra note 99, at 251-52.
135. Robert Shapiro & Paula Stem, Progressive Policy Institute Luncheon Briefing,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
136. Manning & Stem, supra note 97, at 82.
137. Robert B. Oxnam, Asia/Pacific Challenges, 72 FOREIGN POL'Y 58 (1993).
138. Shapiro & Stem, supra note 135.
139. Oxnam, supra note 137, at 58. In 1991, U.S. trans-Pacific trade exceeded trade with
Europe by nearly one third. Bosworth, supra note 116, at 113. In 1993, United States trade
with Asia exceeded its trade with Europe by 50%. Manning & Stem, supra note 97, at 82.
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Asia, 43 the United States trading relationship with Japan is no less impor-
tant. Accounting for 44% of the total U.S. trade with Asia, U.S.-Japanese
bilateral trade is the largest overseas commercial linkage in the world.'"4
Furthermore, the Tokyo-Washington political alliance is the bedrock of Asian
stability. 45 Both nations are deeply committed to democratic government
and basic rights.'" Few things are as unsettling to other Asians as evi-
dence of dysfunction in U.S.-Japanese relations. 47 Thus, despite the fact
that Japan has already been surpassed as a destination for U.S. goods by the
other Asian nations, the U.S.-Japan trading relationship is still vitally impor-
tant. 148
2. Asia Could Be the Key to United States' Economic Prosperity
From the United States' perspective, Asia's economic dynamism could
fuel American growth. While economic performance remains sluggish in the
West, expanding Asian markets 149 continue to absorb American prod-
ucts. 50 Thus, economic prosperity in the United States will depend a great
deal on the continued growth of United States exports. 5' Over an estimat-
ed 40% of U.S. gross domestic product from 1985-1992 is attributable to
143. Japan has an aging and slowly growing economy while those in East Asia are more
economically vital. Asset deflation in Japan is clearly slowing growth and investment and will
dampen growth prospects in the short term. Duesterberg, supra note 117, at 72. The
development of Japan's postwar economy can be broadly divided into three periods: (1) the
recovery period during which Japan built its economy back up to the prewar level; (2) the period
of rapid growth; and (3) the present period of a stable rate of growth. AOTO, supra note 98,
at 73.
144. Jeffrey J. Schott, & Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Implications of NAFTA for U.S. Trade
Policy in the Pacific Basin, in NORTH AMERICA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE WORLD
TRADE REGIME 145, 146 (Robert G. Cushing et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Implications of
NAFTA].
145. See Manning & Stem, supra note 97, at 88 (stating that present strains and suspicions
among Asian nations are exacerbated by the waning security structure which was anchored in
America's military presence). "For more than four decades, the U.S. network of bilateral
alliances and relationships has essentially been the core security system in the region, rooted in
Washington's alliances with Japan . . . ." Id. "Japan . remains the key U.S. partner in the
region. . . ." Oxnam, supra note 137, at 62.
146. See HALL, supra note 99, at 349-57 for a description of how the United States rebuilt
the Japanese government and economy after World War II and forged close political ties with
Japan. See also McKinney, supra note 94, at 124-25 for an explanation of the United States'
role in Japan's economy after World War II.
147. Bosworth, supra note 116, at 123.
148. Id. at 124-25.
149. The Asian economies as a whole are approaching the size of the United States.
Duesterberg, supra note 117, at 75. Current World Bank estimates of GDP based on purchasing
power parity place China as the third-ranking economy in the world. Id.
150. See id. at 76-77.
151. William E. James, Changing Patterns of Trade in Goods and Services in the Pacific
Region: Market-Driven Economic Integration, Bus. ECON., April, 1994, at 20.
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export growth. 52 In 1990 alone, export expansion accounted for 84% of
the growth of U.S. gross national product.'53 Thus, a sustainable growth
and job creation agenda requires an active trade enhancing component. 5 4
Much of the capital needed in the next few decades to restore the sluggish
American economy will be available only in capital-rich Asian countries.'55
Despite NAFTA's vaunted benefits in expanding North American
markets to United States trade, 156 this expansion will not compensate for
any subsequent decreases in Asian trade. Trade with Canada and Mexico
currently accounts for 26.2% of total United States trade."' United States
trade with Asia accounts for 34.8 % of United States trade."'5 The Mexican
economy is much smaller than the Asian economies and the Canadian
economy is already well-developed and unlikely to grow quickly.'59 While
trade between the United States and Mexico has been growing steadily,"' °
it will not compensate for U.S. trade with Asia.' 16 It would take a substan-
tial increase in the volume of U.S. trade with its hemispheric neighbors to
match its trade with Pacific Basin countries. 62 At a time when the United
States is reducing domestic demand through tax increases and reductions in
defense spending, failure to take advantage of the growth potential of export
markets in East Asia would be disastrous.'63
D. United States Turning Away From Asia
Despite the importance of Asia as a trading partner, the United States'
152. Id. (citing Richardson, J.D. Sizing Up U.S. Export Disincentives, Washington, D.C.,
Institute for International Economics, September 1993, at 13).
153. Selected White House Documents on Negotiation of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, Tab 1, at 1, on file in the California Western School of Law Library [hereinafter
Negotiations].
154. James, supra note 151, at 20. The $580 billion of goods and services the U.S.
exported in 1991 represented a bigger part of the $5.7 trillion American economy than
carmaking and homebuilding combined. Brian O'Reilly, Fixing the Economy: How to Keep
Exports on a Roll, FORTUNE, Oct. 19, 1992, at 68. Exports account for 20% of the profits of
American corporations and one in every six American manufacturing jobs. Id.
155. See Rowen, supra note 105; Already seven leading East Asian economies have 41%
of global bank reserves, up from 17% in 1980. Manning & Stem, supra note 97, at 81.
156. Negotiations, supra note 153, at 2.
157. Implications of NAFTA, supra note 144, at 147.
158. Id. These figures include trade with Japan, China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Id. at 148.
159. Id. at 149. In addition, the United States and Canada have been operating under a free
trade agreement since 1989.
160. From 1986-90, U.S. exports to Mexico rose 130%, amounting to $28.4 billion, as a
result of Mexico reducing its import restrictions to comply with GATT provisions. Negotia-
tions, supra note 153, at 2.
161. The $28.5 billion the U.S. exported to Mexico in 1990 is dwarfed by the $140.9
billion the United States exported to East and Southeast Asia in 1992 alone. Oxnam, supra note
137, at 58-59.
162. Id. at 146.
163. Duesterberg, supra note 117, at 74.
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relationship with Asia has deteriorated dramatically.1" This deterioration
threatens to deprive the United States economy of access to the world's
premier growth market. 165
The current emphasis in the United States' trade and economic policy
towards Asia revolves around efforts to reduce the merchandise trade deficit,
primarily with Japan, but increasingly with China. 166 The American drift
toward managed trade, sometimes to promote the export of particular
commodities or to protect the interests of particular American corporations,
caused severe strain in U.S. relations with Japan. 67 A Japan-centered
policy not only diverts attention from policies that could pay larger and more
immediate benefits, but it could also drive other Asian nations away from
close economic cooperation with the United States.
61
The United States' policy towards Japan is not the only vulnerable area
in U.S.-Asian relations. The Clinton administration's preoccupation with
human rights issues, worker's rights in Malaysia and Indonesia, the problem
in East Timor, and the caning of an American youth in Singapore; have
strained relations with much of Southeast Asia.
69
United States-Chinese relations are in even deeper trouble than American
ties with either Japan or Southeast Asia. The United States-China relation-
ship lurched from crisis to crisis through the summer of 1994.17° The
United States and China have clashed over issues as diverse as China's stance
164. EDWIN J. FEULNER, THE HERITAGE FOUND. REP., THE NEW "MALAISE": CLINTON
ADRIFT IN ASIA 500 (1994).
165. Duesterberg, supra note 117, at 73.
166. Id.
167. Harry Harding, Asia Policy to the Brink, 96 FOREIGN POL'Y 57, 63 (Fall 1994). "The
breakdown of the trade talks at the Clinton-Hosokawa summit in February 1994 marked the first
time in recent history that a Japanese government said 'no,' publicly and explicitly, to the United
States." Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. In 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor. Indonesia: East Timor's Past Won't Stay
Buried, THE ECONOMIST, April 23, 1994, at 36. It is estimated that between 100,000 and
200,000 people died as a result of that war. Id. In November, 1991, Indonesian troops shot
at unarmed demonstrators in the Timorese capital, Dilli, killing at least 50 people. Id. The
problems and discontent continue in East Timor today. See id.
In March of 1994, Michael Fay, an American teenager living in Singapore plead guilty to
spray-painting cars and possessing stolen street signs. David Grogan, Whipping Boy, PEOPLE,
April 18, 1994, at 41. He was sentenced in accordance to the laws of Singapore to a $2,200
fine, four months imprisonment, and six strokes on his bare buttocks with a rattan cane. Id.
The "caning" is administered by a martial arts expert and each stroke will "split the flesh." Id.
The United States repeated rebukes of Singapore ". . . for applying its own laws - hitherto
unnoticed as an abuse of human rights when only Asians were caned - was a direct confrontation
with a government which had unabashedly advanced U.S. economic and security goals. .. ."
Manning & Stem, supra note 97, at 87. Now, Singapore has joined Malaysia as a vocal critic
of America, particularly its social and economic problems. Harding, supra note 167, at 63-64.
170. These crises included the imposition of sanctions against China for selling missile
technology to Pakistan and the futile search of a Chinese cargo ship supposedly carrying
materials for chemical weapons to the Middle East. Harding, supra note 167, at 64.
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on human rights and its nuclear and weapon sales to Iran. 7' More
recently, the U.S. refusal to support Beijing's bid for the Olympics in 2000
caused tensions.172
V. THE EFFECT OF NAFTA's RULES OF ORIGIN ON
UNITED STATES-ASIAN TRADE
Against this backdrop, 173 the United States implemented the NAFTA
on January 1, 1994, spawning Asian fears that the Agreement would foster
United States protection of its markets at the expense of Asia's exports to the
United States.'74  This protection of domestic markets is true to some
extent as NAFTA's rules of origin reflect the United States' and Canada's
fears that the Agreement might inadvertently create an "export platform"7"
in Mexico for Asian manufacturing firms, enabling them to bypass United
States and Canadian trade barriers. 176
The Agreement will affect Asian trade with the United States by making
some Mexican exports to the United States cheaper than competing Asian
exports. Thus, NAFTA will have the effect of diverting trade and invest-
ment from Asia to Mexico.
A. Trade Diversion: Cheaper Mexican Goods
Trade diversion occurs when the formation of a preferential trading
arrangement diverts trade from nonmembers to members of the trading
bloc. 177 Since the rules of origin determine which goods are eligible for
171. Barbara B. Constable & David M. Compton, China: The Coming Power, 72 FOREIGN
AFF. 131, 131 (1992).
172. Harding, supra note 167, at 64.
173. Just when the Clinton administration's cumulative missteps in Asia were on the verge
of producing a serious crisis in relations with the region in the spring of 1994, Winston Lord,
Assistant Secretary of State for Asia, submitted a memorandum to Secretary of State Warren
Christopher. Id. at 71. The document warned that the simultaneous erosion of so many of
America's bilateral relationships had "fostered malaise" in the region. Id. In response to the
Lord memorandum, the Clinton administration revised its policy towards Japan and China in
May and June of 1994. Id.
174. Jonathan Marshall, NAFTA Could Divert Trade from Asia, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 17,
1993, at C4; See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
175. The announcement of NAFTA boosted Asian interests in cultivating closer trade and
investment ties with Mexico, hoping that Mexico, with its less stringent tariff barriers, could
serve as a "back door" to the U.S. market. Vithoon Amorn, APEC Weighs Impact of North
American Trade Pact, REUTERS, Sept. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
However, NAFTA's rules of origin requirements will prevent Asian companies from locating
in Mexico to avoid U.S. trade barriers. "Asian firms that invest in Mexico to access NAFTA
will have to use components and labor from the U.S., Mexico, or Canada to qualify for NAFTA
treatment." Stephen Lande, Asia & Europe Watch NAFTA Drama: Think Globally, Trade
Locally, Bus. MEX. 48 (Nov. 1993) available in LEXIS, News Library, Mags File.
176. Amom, supra note 175.
177. George D. Holliday, NAFTA: Effects on Trade with Non-member Countries, 3 MEX.
TRADE & L. REP. 13, 14 (March, 1993).
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NAFTA benefits, NAFTA's rules of origin may lead to significant trade
diversion. 178
Cost reductions from tariff elimination for goods that satisfy NAFTA's
rules of origin will enable North American domestic production to compete
more effectively with exports from Asia and even displace some Asian ex-
ports.' 79 In addition, manufacturers may replace the goods and supplies
they previously bought from third countries with lower-cost goods and
supplies from member countries.8 ° However, these "new" goods and
supplies are cheaper, not because they are produced more efficiently, but
because they avoid the tariffs and duties the third party product must
pay.'8 ' Thus, companies trading out of Asia could find themselves
replaced by others already established within NAFTA.8 2
In NAFTA, Mexico will become a more attractive place from which to
export into the United States because of the reduction in tariffs and other
trade barriers.8 3 Therefore, trade that would have come from Asia may
now come from Mexico.184
This trade diversion effect is what concerns Asia the most. When
former U.S. President George Bush unveiled the NAFTA initiative, Asian
governments and exporters immediately expressed concern that NAFTA
would make Mexican exports to the United States cheaper than similar Asian
exports, effectively squeezing Asia out of its biggest market, the United
States." 8  ASEAN leaders viewed NAFTA as directed at the Asian
countries' export-oriented manufacturing sectors, including textiles,
automobiles, and electronics.8 6  Others concluded that the NAFTA rules
of origin would hurt Asia's export-driven economies by drawing trade and
investment away from Asia' to the Western Hemisphere.
8 8
178. Id.
179. Chwee Huay Ow-Taylor, Facing the Challenge from NAFTA, Bus. TIMES, July 28,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, NEWS file.
180. Holliday, supra note 177, at 15. "The effect of ... rules of origin will be to induce
producers in the free trade area to divert trade from nonmember countries and to source from
less efficient suppliers in the three member countries." Id.
181. See VINER, supra note 5, at 43.
182. See Marshall, supra note 174, at C4. Rules of origin provisions in the NAFTA "will
spur some companies to expand assembly lines within Canada, the United States, or Mexico
instead of shipping finished goods from Asia." Id.
183. Michael Young, NAFTA and the Future of U.S. Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific
Region, in NORTH AMERICA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE WORLD REGIME 139, 140
(Robert G. Cushing et al. eds., 1993).
184. Id. "Mexican goods will increasingly take the place of those now coming into the
United States from Asian countries. Susan Dentzer, The Pain and Gain of Trade, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Sept. 28, 1992, at 62.
185. Michael Di Cicco, UPI, Aug. 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
186. Susumu Awanohara et al., New Kid on the Bloc, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 27, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
187. Isberto, supra note 8. NAFTA could drive $500 million in trade away from Asia each
year. Marshall, supra note 174, at C4.
188. Implications of NAFTA, supra note 144, at 146.
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The Asian fears of cheaper Mexican goods and supplies are not
unfounded. Thirty-eight percent of Mexican exports to the United States,
totaling $31 billion in 1991, consisted of motor vehicles and parts and
electronic goods.'89 These same categories constituted 56% of Malaysia's
exports to the United States."9 Philippine businesses noted that for nearly
every trade product exported to the United States, Mexico directly competes
with the Philippines. 9' Overall, 76% of Asian exports to the United States
compete directly with Mexico's top fifteen exports to the United States. 92
If these goods are replaced with Mexican goods, Asia stands to lose a
significant market for its products.
World Bank economist Alexander Yeats forecasted that Asian manufac-
turers of labor-intensive products such as footwear, toys, and textiles would
suffer export losses up to $400 million annually.'93 Other experts are more
pessimistic. Dr. Kim Kyu Tae, director of the American division of the
Korean Institute of Economics and Trade, concluded that NAFTA's rules of
origin will affect 27% of Korea's total exports. 9 4  As a result, South
Korea's potential trade loss with the United States for 1994 is estimated at
$ 360 million."9  Asian investment analyst Patrick Lim estimates that
Malaysia alone would suffer $396 million in direct export losses, particularly
in the clothing and semi-conductor sectors. 96 The ASEAN estimated that
NAFTA would cause a $2 billion drop in ASEAN exports to the United
States.'97
B. Investment Diversion: "Made in Mexico" instead of "Made in Asia"
The potential that NAFTA's rules of origin could divert manufacturing
and investment in manufacturing from Asia to Mexico is also of concern to
Asia. 98 The Mexican economy is similar in industrial development to the
189. Id. at 51.
190. See Ramon Isberto, Trade: Asia Fears Emergence of Giant American Trade Bloc,
Inter Press Service, Dec. 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Currnt File.
191. Id.
192. Di Cicco, supra note 185. Japanese and South Korean studies suggest that Mexico
will compete with their exports to the United States of computers, textiles, motor vehicles and
parts, and household electrical equipment including color televisions. Jack Taylor, Asian
Exports Could Be Hit by NAFTA, Australian Report Warns, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 5,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, News File.
193. Awanohara, supra note 186.
194. Cayman Kim, NAFTA to Affect South Korean Exports to U.S., JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
195. Id.
196. Southeast Asia Expects Exports to Suffer After NAFTA, J. COMM., Nov, 24, 1992 at
2A.
197. Arasu, supra note 8.
198. See Young, supra note 183, at 140.
[Vol. 25
24
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 25, No. 2 [1995], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol25/iss2/5
NAFTA AND TRADE BETWEEN U.S. AND ASIA
Asian economies,'99 making Mexico a viable alternative to Asia.2' The
NAFTA rules of origin requirements for goods, combined with Mexico's
proximity to the United States and competitive labor force, will make Mexico
more attractive than Asia for U.S. investment.2'
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry estimates that
NAFTA could divert $10 billion of investment in plants and manufacturing
facilities from East Asian countries to Mexico each year over the next eight
years.2 2 This diversion would decrease East Asia's gross domestic product
by $16.5 billion per year.20 3
Gary Hufbauer, a senior economist at the Institute for International
Economics in Washington, estimates that NAFTA could divert about $3
billion in U.S. and foreign investment from developing countries in Asia to
Mexico over the next six years.2' This loss in investment could cost Asia
about $1.5 billion in exports.2 °5
The diversion of investment from Asia to Mexico will be especially
evident in labor-intensive industries as Mexican labor costs are roughly
equivalent to Asian labor costs.2' "U.S. manufacturers will move their
plants to Mexico to lower labor costs," said Dr. Lee Han Ku, Director of the
Daewoo Economic Institute, "and European and Japanese [manufacturers]
will follow.
2 7
C. Fears Over Nothing? NAFTA's Rules of Origin Will
Have No Diversionary Effect
Despite Asia's fears, some claim it is likely that the trade and investment
199. The East Asian countries "have economies that are similar in industrial structure and
factor endowments to the Mexican economy." McKinney, supra note 94, at 128.
200. See Shaun Seow & Phua Kok Kim, Wat NAFTA Means for S'pore and Rest of the
World, THE STRAIT TIMES, Aug. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, NEWS file
(noting that U.S. investment will be drawn away from Asian countries which are at a
comparable level of development as Mexico).
201. "NAFTA could easily provide Mexico, with its abundant and cheap labor, easier
access to the consumers in North American markets and investments from U.S. industries."
Deborah A. Haas, Out of Others' Shadows: ASEAN Moves Toward Greater Regional
Cooperation in the Face of the EC and NAFTA, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 809, 827
(1994).
202. McKinney, supra note 94, at 128.
203. Id.
204. Marshall, supra note 174, at C4.
205. Id.
206. NAFTA will result in competition for Asian developing countries from Mexico in
labor-intensive products. Seow & Kim, supra note 200. While Mexican labor is somewhat
more expensive than labor in Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, it is still cheaper than labor
in the more developed countries of Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, the Philippines, and
Taiwan. NAFTA Partly Against GAIT Rules, Gov't Panel Notes, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE,
Aug. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
207. Kim, supra note 194.
1995]
25
McCall: What is Asia Afraid Of? The Diversionary Effect of NAFTA's Rules
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1995
414 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
diverting effect of NAFTA will be relatively minor. 2°8 The free trade area
NAFTA created was already highly integrated without it. In addition, trade
between the Asian nations may cushion NAFTA's trade diverting effect. The
United States and Canada Free Trade Agreement entered into force on
January 1, 1989.209 Mexico is a small addition to this free trade region.
The Canada-United States Free Trade Area created a market of $6 trillion
when the agreement was signed.20 Adding Mexico increased this market
to $6.2 trillion, Mexico being the "point two.",21 1 Mexico accounts for
about 4 % of the total U.S. output and 6.6 % of the total exports for the North
American free trade region.212 Thus, its incorporation into the free trade
area is unlikely to have any major effect on trade flows. 23
Not only did the United States and Canada establish a free trade area
before NAFTA, but Mexico already enjoyed relatively unfettered access to
the United States market. Recent quota expansion in textiles and steel, and
generous tariff preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences and
duty drawback programs opened the United States market to Mexican goods
before NAFTA. z1 4 Approximately 60% of Mexican goods already enter
the United States duty-free without NAFTA. 215 Furthermore, a study by
the Asian Development Bank found tariffs on most Mexican exports to the
United States were already low, generally between 3 and 4%. Eliminating
these tariffs does little to give Mexican products a price advantage over
Asian products.
Concerns about investment diversion are also overstated. Manufacturers
in Asia are unlikely to shoulder the expense of relocating. Many executives
already operating in Asia may be reluctant to abandon long-standing business
relationships in Asia to suddenly uproot and move to Mexico. 216  "I've
done business in China for 13 years and I've established relationships with
reliable and trustworthy suppliers," said Stephen Willen, director of the New
York-based Worldwide Apparel Sourcing Group. 217 His company, which
sourced $18 million worth of apparel from China alone in 1992, represents
companies such as Sears Roebuck & Co., T.J. Maxx Corp., and other major
U.S. department stores.2 8
Also, Asia is still an attractive investment option. Several manufactur-
208. See Young, supra note 183, at 140. Holliday, supra note 177, at 15. Implications
of NAFTA, supra note 144, at 149-50.
209. Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 47.
210. Orme, supra note 6, at 3.
211. Id.
212. Holliday, supra note 177, at 18.
213. Id.
214. Implications of NAFTA, supra note 144, at 149; Negotiations, supra note 153, at 13.
215. Id.
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ers, especially those producing goods on the high-value end, say they will
continue to base their production in the Asian region to serve the fast-
growing Asia-Pacific market.2"9 In addition, factors reaching beyond
economic motives may cause investors to favor Asia over Mexico. Dr.
Linda Low, a National University of Singapore senior lecturer states: "Other
non-economic considerations have to be factored in, like political stability,
cultural values, work ethic, language, and efficiency of the government. "22
The cost of moving to Mexico with its lack of infrastructure, especially
transportation facilities, could erode incentive to relocate there. 2' This
would be especially true for producers which require high-technology equip-
ment.' Mr. Najeeb Jarhom, research manager of Fraser Securities, added
that the Mexican workforce may not possess the education and skills of Asian
workers223 and thus would not be as attractive as an Asian workforce.
Another reason the effect of NAFTA's rules of origin may be relatively
minor is the increased trade among the Asian nations. Intra-Asian trade now
accounts for about 45% of East Asia's total trade. 24 Investment analyst
Patrick Lim stated that the economic pressure of NAFTA on Asia could be
cushioned by increased trade and investment between ASEAN and China,
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.2" In addition, "China is likely to
stimulate the growth of the Pacific Rim by the year 2010. "226
219. Id. By the year 2000, Asians will account for 3.5 billion of the world's 6.2 billion
people. Rohwer, supra note 95, at 3. One billion of these Asians will be spending money on
houses, cars, electronics, toys, and clothing. Four million of these consumers will have
disposable incomes equal to the wealthy of today. Id.
220. Seow & Kim, supra note 200. Access to low labor rates alone should not trigger an
immediate shift in production to Mexico. Jonathan Cooper, NAFTA's Rule of Origin and its
Effect on the North American Automotive Industry, 14 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 442, 466
(describing the impact of the NAFTA's rules of origin on the United States automobile industry).
"If low labor rates were the most important reason for selecting a production site, Haiti would
likely be the most industrious nation in the world." Id.
221. Di Cicco, supra note 185. "Mexico's weak infrastructure [and] low worker-
productivity . . . serve as significant obstacles to shifting automobile operations to Mexico."
Cooper, supra note 220, at 466.
222. Id.
223. Seow & Kim, supra note 200. An economist at the Nikko Research Centre stated:
"It is questionable whether the quality and costs of Mexican workers are as competitive as those
of Asian workers." Aya Takada, NAFTA Not Seen As Hurting Japan-Asia Economic Ties,
REUTER NEWSWIRE, available in WESTLAW, Int-News database.
224. Manning & Stem, supra note 97, at 83.
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D. Japan: The Most Vociferous Complainant and
the Least Damaged by NAFTA
Japan has been the most vocal complainant about NAFTA.227 A high-
ranking minister in Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry even
went so far as to accuse NAFTA as being against the GATT rules."2 8
However, despite its concerns, Japan is in a far better position to cope
with NAFTA than other Asian countries.229 First, Japanese products are
widely preferred over products from other nations, both for their price and
their quality, and thus Japanese exports may not significantly decline when
faced with cheaper North American goods."3 Second, Japanese businesses
have already made significant investments in the United States, Mexico, and
Canada,"' securing access to the North American market. Japanese invest-
ments in assembly and manufacturing facilities within the NAFTA territory
will enable the Japanese to comply with the stricter local content rules of
NAFTA.
In addition, the Japanese have successfully introduced their coordinated
system of keiretsu2 32 into the United States .233 The keiretsu system in-
volves corporate groups that tend to do business with each other." Each
corporate group has interlocking boards of directors between different
companies in the same group.235 Under the keiretsu system, a Honda plant
will buy automobile parts from its keiretsu-affiliated parts manufacturer, not
227. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. "As the proposed North American
Free Trade Agreement moves closer to creating a potentially powerful hemispheric trade zone,
the government of Japan is voicing increasing anxiety that NAFTA could prove harmful to its
vaunted export machine." Mann, supra note 11, at D2.
228. Yoshikuni Sugiyama, Japan Examines Complex N. American Trade Pact, THE DAILY
YOMIURI, Sept. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File. GATT article 24
allows the formation of regional free trade areas as long as the free trade area does not create
barriers against other nations. Special Protocol, supra note 5, art. XXIV(8)(b), 62 U.N.T.S.
at 62.
229. See McKinney, supra note 94, at 126-30.
230. See Michael Williams, Japan's Surplus for Its Trade Increases 25%, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 15, 1992, at All.
231. For example, three Japanese automobile producers, Toyota, Honda, and Suzuki,
currently have assembly operations in Canada. Suzuki's Canadian operations are a joint venture
with General Motors. Nissan has automobile production facilities in Mexico. McKinney, supra
note 94, at 127.
232. See M.Y. Yoshina, JAPAN'S MANAGERIAL SYSTEM 148-49 (defining keiretsu gaisho
as firms affiliated with a joint company engaged in ordinary business dealings). The Japanese
system involves large firms forging a network of affiliated firms, primarily related through
subcontracting relationships, into a single organization. Id. at 155.
233. There is little direct evidence of the keiretsu system in the United States because the
United States would protest vehemently against its establishment as keiretsu violates most United
States anti-trust laws. See Percy R. Luney, Jr., The Japanese View Toward NAFTA and
Regional Trade Zones, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 297, 301 n.33 (1992).
234. TERUTOMO OZAWA, MULTINATIONALISM JAPANESE STYLE 66 (1979). "Keiretsu are
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allowing other non-affiliated companies to bid for the parts contract on the
basis of price and quality. 236  The keiretsu system permits functionally
integrated corporate groups to capture economies of scale and exploit
industrial linkages as a group. 237 This system allows the Japanese to buy
products within their own corporate group instead of from suppliers. Thus,
the profits from these purchases stay within a singe corporation instead of
being distributed to other corporations. Also, the corporate group will give
its members a more competitive price, lowering the cost of the finished
product.
E. Textiles and Motor Vehicles: The Two Asian
Industries Hardest Hit by NAFTA
While NAFTA may not cause the kinds of problems Asia envisions, the
rigorous rules of origin requirements for textiles and autos will cause some
difficulties.
Textiles and motor vehicles are the two areas under NAFTA that have
the most restrictive rules of origin requirements. Coincidentally, these two
trade sectors are the two Asian industries that will be most affected by
NAFTA's rules of origin.
238
1. Textiles
Asia accounts for a huge share of the U.S. textile and apparel mar-
ket.239 In 1989, textiles accounted for over 30% of all exports from Hong
Kong, South Korea, and the People's Republic of China. 2' The develop-
ing economies of Southeast Asia exported $47.9 billion in clothes alone in
1989; $19.5 billion worth was exported to Canada and the U.S.24' In
1991, China's $13 billion trade surplus with the United States was mostly
from textiles.242
Textile imports into the United States are subject to both quotas and
236. Robert Pear, U.S. Says Honda Skirted Customs Fees, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1991, at
D6. "Honda is willing and able to 'exercise control' over prices charged by Japanese or
Japanese-controlled suppliers to which it is linked in a 'web of cross-ownership.' Some
affiliated auto-parts suppliers 'sell to Honda at a price below their cost of manufacture and
continually operate at a loss.'" Id. (quotes are from U.S. Customs Service Audit on the Honda
case).
237. OZAWA, supra note 234, at 66. A Bush administration official stated that the problem
for American products exported to Japan is non-tariff barriers:". closed markets, keiretsu
driven practices." Mann, supra note 11, at D2.
238. Marshall, supra note 174; See also PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER, NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 14 (1993).
239. Asia accounts for half the U.S. apparel import market. Lande, supra note 175.
240. UNITED NATIONS YEARBOOK, 1990 INT'L TRADE STAT. vol. 1, tbl. 2, at 403, 500,
and 170 [hereinafter INT'L TRADE STAT.].
241. Id.
242. O'Reilly, supra note 154, at 68.
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tariffs under the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA).2 43  The MFA quotas
restrict the quantity of imported textiles that can compete with textiles
produced in the United States, providing strong protection for United States
textile and apparel manufacturers. 244  NAFTA will eliminate both tariffs
and quotas for "qualifying" goods-goods manufactured in North America
that meet the strict NAFTA textile rule of origin.245
Textiles are considered "originating goods" under the NAFTA rules of
origin according to the "yarn-forward" or "fiber forward" rule. 2' The
yarn-forward rule means that textiles and apparel goods must be constructed
from yarn produced in a NAFTA country to be an originating good and
receive the full benefits of NAFTA.247 Cotton products are subject to a
"fiber forward" rule which is similar to the "yarn forward" requirement.
NAFTA will immediately remove import quotas on textiles from Mexico
that qualify as an originating good under the yarn forward or fiber forward
rule.248 The net effect of these eliminations will be the increased importa-
tion into the United States of textiles and apparel manufactured in Mexico
using North American yarn and fabric. 249  These increased imports from
Mexico will occur at the expense of existing imports from Asia.5 In
addition, they will result in an increase in U.S. exports of yarn and fabric to
Mexico, while reducing North American imports of yarn and fabric from
Asian countries. 251
NAFTA will put Asia at a severe disadvantage in the textile market, 52
The origin rules for textiles are among the most restrictive in NAFTA.
Many textile and apparel goods produced in Asia compete directly with those
of Mexico in North American markets. 253  As the U.S. tariffs for non-
originating textiles are currently 17%,15' the removal of these tariffs for
243. Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T.
1001, 930 U.N.T.S. 166.
244. Richard H. Steinberg, Antidotes to Regionalism: Responses to Trade Diversion Effects
of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 315, 330 (1993).
245. NAFTA, supra note 2, at Annex 401, § XI, at 407; Id. Annex 300-B, §§ 2, 3, at 327.
246. Id. Annex 401, § XI, at 407.
247. Id. Critics have exaggerated this restrictive requirement by claiming that the wool
used to make the yam must be gathered from sheep that have lived in North America for four
generations. Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Julius Katz, Remarks on the North American
Free Trade Agreement in a USIA WorldNet Broadcast, Sept. 23, 1992, transcript available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
248. NAFTA, supra note 2, Annex 300-B, app. 3.1 (B)(10)-(1 1), at 340.
249. Steinberg, supra note 244, at 331.
250. Id. NAFTA is expected to benefit U.S. apparel firms that use Mexico as a low-cost
manufacturing base to compete with East Asian products in the U.S. and Mexico. POTENTIAL
IMPACT, supra note 42, at 8-6.
251. See POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 42, at 8-6.
252. Lande, supra note 175, at 50. NAFTA will make Mexico an attractive alternative to
the large apparel producers in Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Taiwan which face
restrictions in access to the U.S. market. POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 42, at 8-4.
253. McKinney, supra note 94, at 128.
254. Lande, supra note 175, at 50.
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Mexican textiles which qualify as originating goods will place Asian
producers at a distinct price disadvantage. 25
2. Motor Vehicles
In 1990, Japan and South Korea exported nearly $24 billion worth of
passenger motor vehicles, wholly produced in Asia, into Canada and the
United States.5 6 These Asian automobile imports do not contain any North
American components. Consequently, they did not satisfy the rules of origin
requirements for duty-free entry into the United States under the pre-NAFTA
rules, 7 nor will they satisfy the NAFTA rules of origin. Therefore,
NAFTA will have relatively little practical impact on these exports to North
America.5 1
In addition, the United States tariff on automobiles from Asia is only
2.5%.' 9  Since this tariff is so low, the United States elimination of its
barriers to passenger automobiles manufactured in Mexico will have little
effect on the relative competitiveness of Asian automobiles. 26  The low
tariff on Asian automobiles does not increase the cost of an Asian automobile
by a significant amount compared to a Mexico-produced automobile.",
Although NAFTA will not decrease North American sales of Asian
automobiles by much, it will affect the Asian automobile parts industry
significantly. 62 The general NAFTA rule of origin for automobiles will
require 62.5% regional content to qualify for NAFTA benefits. 63  The
former regional content requirement was 50%.264 Thus, the 62.5%
NAFTA rule of origin will provide a strong incentive for North American
automobile manufacturers to use North American auto parts.65
The 62.5% local content requirement will also impact Japanese
automobile manufacturing facilities located in North America.266 While
255. McKinney, supra note 94, at 128.
256. This number excludes buses. INT'L TRADE STAT., supra note 240, vol. II, at 1192-
93.
257. Before, NAFTA, automobiles which contained 50% North American product
benefitted from the Canada-United States Free Trade Area rules of origin requirements. U.S.-
Canada FTA, supra note 47, at annex 301.2, at 297-98, § XVII, paras. 3-5, at 305-06.
258. Steinberg, supra note 244, at 332.
259. See NAFTA, supra note 2, Annex 302.2, HTS no. 8703, at 311.
260. Steinberg, supra note 244, at 333.
261. Id.
262. In 1990, Japan and Korea exported approximately $6.5 billion of motor vehicle parts
to Canada and the United States. 1990 INT'L TRADE STAT. Y.B. at 1198-99.
263. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 403(5)(a), at 351.
264. U.S.- Canada FTA, supra note 47, at Annex 301.2, at 297-98, § XVII, para. 2, at
305-306.
265. Steinberg, supra note 244, at 332.
266. See NAFTA Impacting Investment Strategy; 62.1% of Subsidiaries in U.S. Are
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these automobiles are assembled in North America with a North American
workforce, most of the components for the automobiles are currently
imported from Japan.267 These plants were designed to take advantage of
the 50% local content rule268 in place before NAFTA's 62.5% require-
ment. 269  The higher local content rule will force Japanese automakers to
upgrade their North American manufacturing process to include more North
American parts, costing them billions of dollars,70 to take advantage of
NAFTA's preferential treatment.
In addition, NAFTA will have serious adverse effects on Asian imports
of light trucks to the United States.27 The current U.S. truck tariffs of
twenty-five percent for most light trucks 72 will be eliminated for Mexican-
produced light trucks.2173  Thus, light trucks, and possibly minivans which
satisfy NAFTA rules of origin will gain a strong advantage over comparable
Asian-produced products, as they will not be subject to the 25% tariff.274
NAFTA will divert some production from Asia to Mexico, as producers seek
to avoid the 25 % U.S. tariff on the Asian-produced vehicles.275
VI. ASIAN REACTION TO NAFTA: FORMATION OF AN
ASIAN FREE TRADE AREA
Despite the high trade stakes involved in the implementation of
267. John Eckhouse, How U.S. Depends on Big 3: Automakers Help Fuel the Economy,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 31, 1992, at B1 (discussing ECONOMIC STRATEGY INSTITUTE, THE CASE FOR
SAVING DETROIT (1992)). Japanese automobile factories in the United States generally import
a high percentage of their most expensive parts and buy many other components from Japanese-
owned U.S. suppliers. Id. at B2. The Economic Strategy Institute estimates that only about 39%
of the factory price of a car built at a transplant factory represents pure U.S. content, compared
to 88% for a domestic car built by Ford, GM, or Chrysler. Id.
Figuring that 30% of the 1.9 million Japanese cars built in the U.S. displaced imports that
otherwise would have been sold here, the Economic Strategy Institute (ESI) credits the Japanese
plants with creating 41,154 jobs and contributing $2.9 billion to the economy. Id. However,
70% of these Japanese sales displaced sales of Ford, GM and Chrysler. Id. The lower domestic
content of the Japanese cars caused the loss of 124,355 U.S. jobs and a loss of $9.2 billion to
GNP. Id. In sum, the Japanese-owned factories in the U.S. caused a net loss of 83,201 jobs
and a reduction of $6.3 billion GNP.
268. U.S.-Canada FTA, supra note 47, at 297-98, at Annex 301.2, § XVII, para. 2, at
305-306.
269. See Luney, supra note 233, at 300-301.
270. NAFTA's rules of origin could result in expensive re-tooling costs for Japanese-owned
automotive corporations in the United States. See Cooper, supra note 219, at 461.
271. In 1990, Japan and South Korea exported approximately $2.3 billion worth of light
trucks to Canada and the United States. INT'L TRADE STAT., supra note 240, vol. II, at 1194-
95.
272. NAFTA, supra note 2, at 311, Annex 302.2, HTS nos. 8704.21.00, 8704.31.00,
8704.22.00 and 87.04.90.00.
273. Id. at HTS nos. 8704.31, 8704.32, and 8702.90, and note 1 to Chapter 87 of the
schedule.
274. Lande, supra note 175, at 50.
275. Steinberg, supra note 244, at 332.
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NAFTA's rules of origin, Asia has not come up with a concerted response. 276
However, there has been movement within Asia to establish a free trade area
similar to NAFTA.
The strongest response seems to be the Malaysian call for an Asian free
trade area.277 This free trade area, the East Asian Economic Caucus
(EAEC) would specifically exclude Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United States.278 After the announcement of NAFTA in 1992, the EAEC
gained momentum.27 9
However, ASEAN is currently the only regional trading group in Asia
and it has met with limited success. Intraregional trade as a proportion of
total trade among ASEAN members grew from three percent in 1980 to just
four percent in 1990. 2  Not even five percent of this small amount of
intraregional trade was covered by preferential trading agreements.28I
However, the ASEAN leaders recognize ASEAN's lackluster performance
in the past and realize that economic cooperation must now play a central
role in the Association. 2 Although ASEAN has met with limited success
in the past, NAFTA seems to have provided the impetus to strengthen the
organization. 23
In January, 1992, ASEAN pledged to strengthen economic, political, and
security ties among its members .2 ' To achieve these goals, the ministers
proposed the creation of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).285
Notwithstanding Asian fears of NAFTA, there is little incentive for
Asian countries to develop broad regional trade arrangements in the Pacific
Basin without United States participation. 2' Even though the volume of
276. Ow-Taylor, supra note 179.
277. Kym Anderson, NAFTA, Excluded Pacific Rim Countries, and the Multilateral Trading
System, in THE CHALLENGE OF NAFTA: NORTH AMERICA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND
THE WORLD TRADE REGIME 33, 46-50 (Robert G. Cushing et al. eds., 1993). See also Luney,
supra note 230, at 304-306; Ow-Taylor, supra note 179, at 42.
278. See U.S. Official Says EAEC is Good for Free Trade, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Oct.
19, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File. The logic for excluding the North
Americans is that if they insist on forming exclusive economic blocs, East Asia could similarly
put up barriers. Id.
279. NAFTA appears to have given the EAEC new impetus after Asia's lukewarm reaction
to its proposal in 1988. Japan, which was previously against an Asian regional trading area,
warmed to the idea after the announcement of the NAFTA even though the country fears
antagonizing the United States. Id.
280. Panagariya, supra note 170.
281. Id.
282. Haas, supra note 201, at 809.
283. See id. at 809-11 for a detailed background of the events that led up to the AFTA and
other regional trading groups currently being discussed in Asia.
284. Singapore Declaration of 1992, Jan. 28, 1992, Brunei-Indon.-Malay.-Phil.-Sing.-Thai.,
31 I.L.M. 498 (1992).
285. Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, Jan. 28, 1992,
Brunei-Indon.-Malay.-Phil.-Sing,-Thai., 31 I.L.M. 506, 508 (1992). See Haas, supra note 201
for a detailed explanation of the AFTA's provisions.
286. Implications for NAFTA, supra note 144, at 156.
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Asian intraregional trade has grown in recent years, too much Asian trade
still depends on trade across the Pacific to the United States for the region
to contemplate creating an Asian trade cocoon.287
CONCLUSION
NAFTA is a little over one year old now and its first year has not been
without troubles, especially for Mexico. The day that the NAFTA went into
effect, some of the poorest people in Mexico began a 12-day uprising in the
remote southern highlands of Chiapas.288 In March, 1994, presidential
candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio was assassinated. 289  The worst came in
the last week of December, when jittery investors pushed the peso down
30%.29
In spite of these problems, U.S. trade with Mexico increased 22%
through September, 1994.291 In addition, the peso devaluation is largely
seen as positive for Mexico. It will reduce Mexico's trade deficit by raising
the cost of imports while making Mexican products more competitively
priced in world markets.
It is still too soon to tell if NAFTA will substantially affect U.S. trade
with Asia. The rules of origin provisions relating to automobiles will not
even come into effect for another three years .293 However, U.S. companies
are investing in Mexican production facilities at a record rate. 294 After the
implementation of NAFTA, hundreds of U.S. companies increased their
exports to Mexico.295 Overall, NAFTA will have some diversionary effect
on Asian trade with the United States, but this effect will not be as potent as
Asia fears. Undoubtedly, the textile and automobile industry will feel the
brunt of NAFTA's impact the most.
In other areas, United States' tariffs are quite low so a reduction in U.S.
tariffs to Mexico will not make Mexican goods that much cheaper.
Moreover, the North American region was already quite integrated before the
287. Id.
288. Richard Lacayo, The Plunger, The Peso Heads South, TIME, Jan. 29, 1995, at 45.
289. Id.
290. Richard Aim, Trade Expands in NAFTA's First Year, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Dec. 25, 1994, at IA.
291. Id.
292. Lacayo, supra note 288, at 47.
293. NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 403.
294. Through October, 1994, foreign investors were planning to pump a little over $8
billion into Mexico's economy in 1995, nearly matching 1994's record pace. Aim, supra note
290.
295. "Ford Motor Co. expects to ship 25,000 U.S.-made cars to Mexico this year [1994],
up from just 1,500 in 1993. General Motors anticipates a jump from 1,700 to 10,000.
Caterpillar Inc. credits NAFTA for a 77 percent increase in exports to Mexico in the first six
months of this year [1994]." Id. Honeywell projects a 60% increase in sales in 1994 because
the 20% tariff on personal computers was eliminated by NAFTA. Id. AT&T Corp. joined
Grupo Alfa Industrial in a $1 billion joint venture for long-distance. Id.
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formation of the NAFTA. In addition, the trade and investment diverting
effects will probably be dwarfed by the increase in growth of Mexico. 296
The sheer numbers alone dictate that the United States continue to foster
trade relations with Asia. By the year 2000, Asians297 will account for 3.5
billion of the world's 6.2 billion people.298 One billion of these Asians will
be living in households with some consumer-spending power. 299 They will
be spending money on houses, cars, electronics, toys, and clothing. The
Asian nations are not mere producers of consumer goods for the U.S. They
are now an important market for U.S. goods and services. The rocket-like
growth and size of Asia's emerging middle class will create some of the
biggest business and financial opportunities in history.
Benjamin Franklin once asserted: "No nation was ever ruined by
trade. '' 31 Trade as a whole is immensely beneficial to a nation as it
stimulates economic growth. Economic growth opens new markets,
stimulates new technology, and increases the standard of living of the
nation's people. In its efforts to increase its trade with its neighbors, the
United States must not lose sight of its vital trans-Pacific trading partners.
Kathryn L. McCall*
296. Young, supra note 183, at 140-41.
297. "Asian" here means people living on the Asian continent (including Japan) east of
Iran, but outside the former Soviet Union. Rohwer, supra note 96, at 3.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. FRANKLIN, supra note 1.
* B.S., cum laude, University of Southern California; J.D. 1995, California Western
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